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NATURE OF CASE 
6 : This is an action for a declaratory judgment to de-
termine the meaning and effect of a provision in high-
way construction contract. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT 
Following trial without a jury the court entered a 
judgment of dismissal, no cause of action. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal and remand with directions 
to enter judgment for the plaintiff and appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For many years it has been the practice of the Utah 
State Road Commission, hereinafter called "the Com-
1 
mission," to publish standard specifications for road and 
bridge construction and incorporate them in its con-
tracts. A 1960 edition was used until March 1968 when 
the Commission published a new "Standard Specifica-
tion for Road and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue." 
This action involves the interpretation of a contrac-
tual provision introduced into the interim specifications 
to change the method of measuring and paying for 
"compaction and backfill," i.e., placing soil around struc-
tures and pipes and compacting it to the required den· 
sity. 
In Section 6-:n of the 1960 Specifications (Ex. ti· 
P) such work had not been identified as compaction and 
backfill but as "mechanical tamping," paid for at an 
agreed price per hour. The price was to be full compen· 
sation for furnishing and operating the equipment, as 
well as work incidental to backfilling and not included 
in other contract items. 
This type of specification is referred to by the Road 
Commission as a "method" specification ( R. I U) inas· 
much as the contract prescribes just what will be done i11 
2 
nl'flf'r tn [1('('11111plish prt~~l'l'ihl'd l'tllllp:wtio11. T II l \lt1:'l the 
L'u1111uis~iu11 aduptcJ a11 ··e11d result .. type ~vtcificatiu11 
for compaction and lmckfill which nu longer used an 
hourly rate as the basis of payment. The new section 
(Ex. 2-P) proYide<l for payment by the cubic yard: 
"208.03 1ll etlwd uf i~I easnrement: 'Compaction' 
shall be measme<l by cubic yard. The quantity 
shall be the rnlume of the 'Roadway Excavation,' 
'Structural Excavation,' and 'Borrow,' placed on 
the roadway embankment measured in its origi-
nal position, less the amount paid for 'Backfill.' 
~ o payment will be made for material not com-
pacted, such as waste, material used for sur-
charges, or initial layer over soft ground placed 
for a working platform for equipment. For com-
paction through cuts, or the natural ground under 
embankments, the quantity shall be the product 
of the compacted area, and a compacted depth of 
8 inches. 
"Backfill shall be measured b~· the cubic yard of 
material in final position in excavated area or em-
bankment adjacent to a structure limited as fol-
lows: 
"On fittings, abutments, piers, box culverts, pay-
ments shall be limited to the area bounded by ver-
tical plains one foot outside the footings to the 
height of the material placed adjacent to the 
structure. No payment shall be made for material 
placed :tbove the eleYation of the top of box cul-
verts or other buried structures except pipe. 
"On pipes, the measurements shall be limited to 
vertical plains two feet wider than the outside 
JJipe diameter and one-half of the pipe diameter 
01 1er the top of the pipe, limited to two feet." 
(Emphasis added) 
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Sometime before l\lay 21, IU08, the Commission in-
vited contractors lo bid on a coutraet for construction o! 
a portion of the belt route in Salt Lake City. To be in-
corporated in the c.:ontract was "Standard Specificatiom 
for Road and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue, 
.March HW8.'. The plaintiff, hereinafter sometimes called 
"the Company," was a bidder for the project. 
To prepare its bid under the uew "end result" spe-
c.:ification it was necessary for the Company to proceed 
in three steps: first, it determined the total cost of labor 
and equipment needed to perform the compaction and 
backfill operations; second, it determined the number of 
units, i.e., the number of cubic yards for which payment 
was to be made under the specification; and third, it di-
vided the total costs by the number of cubic yards to ar· 
rive at a price per cubic yard to be included in its bid 
(R. 72) 
In determining the number of cubic yards for whiclt 
it would be paid the Company had to decide whether tu 
include or exclude the Yolume of the pipes around whicl1 
backfill was to be placed and compacted. The Company's 
estimators were aware that the rectangle described ill 
section 208.03 would not accurately reflect the amount 
of material actually placed, but was an arbitrary de· 
scription used to proYide simplicity in computing 
amounts to be irn1d, eliminating the need of measuring 
actual quautities. ::\Iorc<n-er, c\·cn if the volume of the 
l)ipe was to be inclu<ll'd for computation purposes, t!Jt 
arbitrary, c.:ornputcd <1uantity represents less than half tll 
4 
the amount of backfill actually placed and compacted 
1R. 79, Exs. 15-P and 16-P). The specifications were 
discussed by the Company's estimators, who concluded 
that the volume of the pipe would not be deducted and 
that they would be paid for all materials within the boun-
daries of the rectangle described in Section 208.03 (R. 
78). They made their computations accordingly. Had 
they deducted for the volume of the pipe the unit price, 
of course, would have been considerably higher. 
Among the factors that led the Company estimators 
lo that conclusion were these: In both the 1960 and 1968 
specifications for "underdrains," which are substantially 
lhe same as pipes insofar as the backfill operation is con-
cerned ( R. 102), there is an express provision requiring 
deduction of the quantity displaced by the pipe (Ex. 4-
P, Sec. 6-2.4 and Ex. 2-P, Sec. 602.05); the quantity to 
bepaid for was still less than that actually to be placed; 
in computing quantities for "roadway excavation" there 
is no deduction for pipes in the excavated areas; in pay-
ing for concrete the Commission makes no deduction for 
pipes located within the concrete; and in an item relating 
1 to excavation for salvaging and relaying pipe, the volume 
1 of the pipe is paid for as part of the excavation (R. 95). 
The Company did not contact the Commission to 
obtain an interpretation of Section 208.03 because at-
tempts to obtain interpretations in the past had not been 
1
e satisfactory ( R. 91). Moreover, since the contract was 
1r to be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding, it 
Jf would have been unfair to give an interpretation of the 
5 
clause only to Gibbons and Reed Company; and it is the 
policy of the Commission to try and a void discussing the 
meanings of contractual provisions with contracton 
prior to bid openings unless the information in such dh-
cussions can be passed on to all of the other bidders, the 
Commission recognizing that otherwise one bidder would 
have an advantage over the others (R. 117). 
Gibbons and Reed Company submitted the low bici 
on the project and on May 24, 1968, was awarded the 
contract ( R. US). 'Vork commenced on June 4, 1968, 
and in August or September it was learned by the Com-
pany's project manager that the Commission, in com-
puting backfill quantities for progress payments wa) 
paying the Company on the basis of the rectangular fig-
ure described in 208.03, less the volume of the pipe. Se~ 
Exhibits 15-P and 16-P. The differences between the 
parties' interpretations of 208.03 was thereupon pointea 
out by the Company project manager to Stewart H 
Knowlton, the Commission's resident engineer in charge 
of the project ( R. 80, 100) . 
. Mr. Knowlton was aware of the provision. Then 
had been some discussion about it within his own organ· 
ization but he wasn't sure whether the discussions wer1 
had before or after those with the contractor (R. 99! 
Some of Mr. Knowlton's "key people" had questiow 
about the meaning of the specification ( R. 101). Br 
cause of the disagreement among his staff l\Ir. Knowl· 
ton called the District Constrnction Engineer and Chirt 
of Design Crew Section and was told that the specific:i 
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tions should be interpreted to exclude the volume of the 
pipe (R. 101). 
After raising the question orally with the resident 
engineer ( R. 112), the company wrote a letter question-
ing the Commission's interpretation (Ex. 8-P). This 
generated some inter-office correspondence within the 
Department of Highways. 
On October 14, 1968, the resident engineer wrote a 
memorandum (Ex. 10-P) to J. B. Skewes, Engineer 
for Construction. Referring to the specification the resi-
dent engineer said: 
"The wording and intent of the specifications on 
backfill on pipes came up for discussion in this 
office soon after the contract on this project was 
awarded. It was further discussed with person-
nel and other echelons of the department. While 
it was generally agreed that it was intended that 
the volume of pipe should be deducted from the 
measurement between vertical planes two feet 
wider than the outside of the pipe, some disagree-
ment was evidenced as to the clarity of the actual 
wording. 
"In view of the controversy subsection 208.03 has 
raised it is requested that the provision be re-
viewed at departmental level and a decision pub-
lished as to whether the volume of the pipe be de-
ducted or included for payment." (Emphasis 
added) 
The memornndum was routed through Kenneth 
Hepworth, District Two Construction Engineer. In 
eommenting upon the question raised by the contractor, 
~Ir. Hepworth said: 
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"It is believed the \\'hole of the specif ica ti on must 
be considered, and that in this instance the word, 
'material and 'adjacent' cannot be disregarded. I1 
is reasonable that the word 'material' in this speci-
fication is intended to refer to the actual soil u1 
aggregate to be placed around the pipe and doe1 
not refer to the pipe itself or the air within the 
pipe. The word 'adjacent' means 'next to' ana 
does not mean 'within' and, therefore, is a limiting 
factor in determination of the backfill to be paid 
for. 
"In view of the foregoing it is recommended that: 
"I. The contractor's request for payment of the 
Yolume occupied by the pipe be denied. 
"2. That the specifications be written to either 
include or to exclude the volume of the pipe 
in the method uf measurement of the backfill. 
"3. That a limiti11g plane below the pipe also be 
included in the method of measurement. Thi1 
to circumvent the possibility of a contractur 
requesting payment for backfill from the na· 
tural ground where pipes are placed in em· 
bankment sections." (Emphasis added) 
.Mr. Hepworth made the recommendation because 
"contractors and other people" often adopt meaning1 
which "tend to hlYor their position," but he admitted that 
it is not his habit to recommend changes in specificatiom 
each time a contractor questions the meaning of a speci· 
fication ( R. 128). 
The recommendation in fact led to a change in the 
wording of 208.0:3. In X m·ember, 1968, supplemental 
specifications to the interim issue of the Standard Speci· 
8 
i'ications were published. The questioned prov1s10n in 
:iubsection 208.03 was amended to read as follows: 
"BrJC!tfill shall be measured by the cubic vard of 
material in final position in excavated area: or em-
bankment adjacent to a structure limited as fol-
lows:*** 
"On pipes, the measurement shall be limited to 
vertical planes two feet wider than the outside 
pipe diameter and one-half the pipe diameter over 
the top of the pipe, limited to two feet. The meas-
urement shall only include the material placed 
and the volume of the pipe shall be excluded." 
(Ex. 3-P.) 
The Commission and its resident engineer recog-
nized that the Company and its employees to be skilled 
and competent. Mr. Kearns, the Company's project 
manager, was "a very competent, energetic, capable ex-
ecutive" who maintained a close relationship with the 
resident engineer during construction of the compli-
cated project (R. 111). Mr. Skewes found Gibbons and 
Reed Company to be skilled and competent contractors 
(R. 119). 
The Gibbons and Reed contract was not the only 
one in which the question of inclusion or exclusion of the 
pipe volume was of concern to the Commission. Mr. Carl 
Fonnesbeck, the Commission's resident engineer in Tre-
monton was in charge of a contract with Fife Construc-
tion Company. In sending in his first two estimates for 
backfill quantities. Mr. Fonnesbeck computed the quan-
tities by including the volume of the pipe, but was told 
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by the Commission thereafter to deduct for the volume 
of the pipe ( R. 129). 
\Vhen it became clear that the Road Commissiu1. 
was not going to make payment for the quantities 3, 
computed by Gibbons and Reed Company this action 
was initiated. In its action for a declaratory judgment 
the Company took the position that the contract shoulu 
be interpreted as not providing for deduction of the vo]. 
ume of the pipe; and that at the very least, the contract 
was ambiguous and, having been prepared by the Corn. 
mission, should be given effect as interpreted by the 
Company if such an interpretation was a reasonable one. 
In late 1969, both parties moved for summary judg· 
ment. The respective motions were heard on November 
14, 1969, following which the court denied both motiom 
on the ground that there were genuine issues of material 
fact to be determined, indicating that in the court's opin· 
ion the contract was ambiguous and required factual 
matters for a resolution of the ambiguity. 
The case was tried to the court on March 11, 1971. 
and notwithstanding the oyerwhelming, unrebutted eri· 
dence (including admissions by the Commission) that 
the contract was ambiguous, the court entered a judg· 
ment of dismissal, in effect adopting the interpretation 
of the Road Commission. The judgment was based upon 
the following finding and conclusion: 
"The aboYe specifications are not ambiguous anll 
were eorrcetl~, interpreted by def end ant by meal· 
urincr the outside climensions of the planes de· 
I:"> 
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scribed in 208.03 and deducting therefrom the 
volume displaced by the pipe thereby paying only 
for the actual material in final position as required 
by the specification. * * * 
"Specification 208.03 of the Interim Standard 
Specifications, March 1968, is not ambiguous and 
the procedure followed by defendant in deduct-
ing the volume of the pipe was a correct interpre-
tation of the specification 208.03." ( R. 48.) 
Having found the contract to be clear and certain, 
the Court made no finding with respect to the reason-
ableness of the interpretation placed upon the provision 
by appellant. 
ARGCl\IENT 
I 
1-'he court's firuling that the specifications of the 
contract relating to measurement of backfill were not 
ambiguous is 1insupported by the evidence and is con-
trary to law. 
Except with respect to the most simple agreements, 
it is almost impossible for a court to interpret a contract 
without taking into account a number of extrinsic facts 
and circumstances, including the situation of the parties, 
the apparent purpose of the contract, and their prior 
eontracting experiences. The approach was well de-
srribed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Bay 
Pctroleuni Corporation v. May, 286 P.2d 269 (Okla. 
1955), as follows: 
11 
"In considering this transaction we must plac~ 
ourselves as far as possible in the position of tlit 
parties when the contract was entered into anti 
consider the instrument itself as drawn, its pur 
poses, and the circumstances surrounding th1 
transactiou, and, from a consideration of all the 
elements determine upon what sense or meanin1, 
of the terms used their minds actually met." id. :i 
271. 
Modern courts and writers recognize that the ques-
tion of "ambiguity' should not be determined solely upon 
a particular judge's experience with the use of the lan-
guage, or by dictionary definitions, since meanings fre-
quently change and within certain industries and pro-
fessions specialized meanings arise. 
Professor Arthur L. Corbin in his treatise point1 
out that words in a contract seldom have "only one true 
meaning.'' See 3 Corbin on Contracts §§535, 536: 
"Sometimes it is saicl that 'the courts will not dis· 
regard the plain language of a contract or inter· 
palate something not contained in it.' also 'the 
courts wili not write contracts for the parties tu 
them or construe them other than in accordance 
with the plain and literal meaning of the languagt 
used.' It is true that when a judge reads the word~ 
of a contract he may jump to the instant and con· 
fident opinion that they have but one reasonable 
meaping and that he knows what it is. A greatrr 
familiarity with dictionaries and the usage o! 
words, a .better understanding of the uncertain· 
ties of language, and a c<nnparative study of more 
cases in the field of interpretation, will make onr 
beware of holding such an opinion so recklessh 
arrived at. * * * 
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"* * * it can hardly be insisted on too of ten and 
too vigorously that language at its best is always 
a defective and uncertain instrument, that words 
do not define themselves that terms and sentences 
consist of the ideas that they induce in the minds 
of some indivi<lual person who uses or hears or 
reads them, and that seldom in a litigated case do 
the words of a contract convey one identical mean-
ing to the two contracting parties or to third per-
sons. Therefore, it is invariably necessary, before 
a court can give any meaning to the words of a 
contract and can select one meaning rather than 
other possible ones as the basis for the determina-
tion of rights and other legal effects, that extrin-
sic evidence shall be heard to make the court 
aware of the 'surrounding circumstances,' includ-
ing the persons, objects and events to which the 
words can be applied and which caused the words 
to be used." 
In a recent law review article "The Interpretation 
of \V ords and the Parol Evidence Rule," 50 Cornell 
L.Q. 161 ( 1965) Professor Corbin gives further treat-
ment to the problem: 
"First and foremost, extrinsic evidence is always 
necessary in the interpretation of a written instru-
ment: In determining the meaning and intention 
of the parties who executed or relied upon it, in 
applying it to the objects and perso~s invol~ed in 
the litigated or otherwise disputed issues, m de-
termining the specific legal operation that justice 
requires to be given to the written instrument .. In 
this process of interpretation, no relevant credible 
evidence is inadmissible merely because it is ex-
trinsic; all such evidence is necessarily extrinsic. 
\Vhen a court makes the often repeated statement 
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that the written words are so plain and clear anu 
ambiguous that they need no interpretation an1[ 
that evid~nce is not admissible, it is making an in· 
terpretat10n on the sole basis of the extrinsic evi. 
dence of its own linguistic experience and educa. 
tion, of which it merely takes judicial notice." id. 
at 188-189. 
In the instant case two district court judges (in. 
eluding the one who entered the challenged finding) be· 
lieved there was sufficient doubt as to the contract'~ 
meaning that extrinsic evidence was required. But in the 
final analysis the trial judge closed his mind to the evi· 
dence adduced and interpreted the contract on the sole 
basis of his own linguistic experience. 
In its original inter-off ice memorandum and in ih 
argument to the court the Commission, in interpretin~ 
Section 208.03 reasoned as follows: the important words 
are "material in final position in excavated area or em· 
bankment adjacent to a structure," and inasmuch as ma· 
terial cannot be adjacent to a structure if it is within it 
the volume of the pipe must be deducted. 
But the paragraph can be read in at least two dif· 
f erent ways. The section provides: 
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard ol 
material in final position in excavated area or eni· 
bankment adjacent to a structure limited as fol· 
lows: 
"On fittings, abutments, piers, box culverts, pay· 
ment shall be limited to the area bounded by ve1" 
tical planes one foot outside the footings to tl1t 
height of the material placed adjacent to the 
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structure. No payment shall be made fm material 
placed above the elevation of the top of box cul-
verts or other buried structures except pipe. 
"On pipes, the measurements shall be limited to 
vertical planes two feet wider than the outside 
pipe diameter and one-half of the pipe diameter 
over the top of the pipe, limited to two feet." 
The three paragraphs merit some analysis. The 
Commission assumes that "adjacent to a structure" ap-
plies to "material in excavated areas," but the first para-
graph above quoted is not that clear. The first sentence is 
so written that the phrase "adjacent to a structure" seems 
to modify only "embankment" and not "material in final 
position." 
This construction makes sense because the second 
paragraph relates entirely to embankment placed next 
to footings, abutments, piers and box culverts, and the 
paragraph again expressly refers to material "adjacent 
to the structure." 
But in the third paragraph, relating to pipes, which 
are located in "excavated areas," there is no reference to 
material ''adjacent to the structure" or "'adjacent to the 
pipe." 
Moreover, the evidence shows that if payment were 
to be made for all "material in final position in the ex-
cayated area" the company would have been entitled to 
more money than with payment limited to the rectangle 
tles<'l'ibed in the last paragraph. 
The use of the word "limited" in the three para-
15 
graphs is of some significance. "Limited" means "to a). 
sign to or within certain limits." The word "limit" implie1 
"a point in space, time, speed or the like, beyond whicn 
a person or thing cannot go or is not permitted to go. 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary ( 1961 Ed.) p. 48R 
The provision for measurement of backfill arouna 
pipes can reasonably be paraphrased to read: 
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yards of 
material in final position in excavated area * * * 
limited as follows: * * * 
"On pipes, measurement may not exceed a rec-
tangle formed by vertical planes two feet wider 
that the outside pipe diameter and one-half of the 
pipe diameter over the top of the pipe, limited to 
two feet." 
The foregoing interpretation makes more sense than 
that chosen by the Commission, even if other contractual 
provisions and extrinsic circumstances are not consid· 
ered. 'Vhen they are considered, the interpretation is de· 
mantled. 
The following facts are important in interpreting 
the specification: 
I. The specification was a new one, and this was one 
of the first contracts in which it was of any substantial 
importance. 
2. Pipes are not ordinarily placed in rectangular 
trenches. The "General Safety Orders Covering Vtaf1 
Industries," published by the Industrial Commission ol 
Utah (Ex. 7-P), requires either the sloping or the shor· 
16 
ing, sheeting and bracing of excavations for trenches. It 
is customary to slope rather than shore ( R. 94) . 
3. 111 the contrad specifications relating to granular 
backfill around underdrains (substantially the same as 
backfill around pipes) the specification expressly pro-
rides for exclusion of the volume of the pipe. 
4. The Gibbons and Reed estimators who prepared 
the bids discussed the matter and actually interpreted 
the provision as not requiring deduction for pipe. 
5. At least one of the Commission's resident en-
gineers interpreted the provision as not requiring deduc-
tion for the pipe. 
6. Gibbons and Reed Company, which interpreted 
the specification as it did, was experienced and knowl-
eugable in the contracting business. 
7. In Commission contracts there are several in-
~tances in which pipe volume is disregarded in measuring 
for payments, e.g., in roadway excavation, placement of 
concrete, excavations for salvaging and relaying pipe. 
8. The rectangle used in describing the area for 
11hich payment is to made is an arbitrary figure repre-
senting less material than is actually placed in a typical 
excavation. 
9. Since the contract was not a negotiated one, the 
eontractor was not free to discuss the meaning of the 
specification with or to obtain clarification from the 
Commission. 
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10. The fact that the contract provision was amen1J. 
ed by the Commission shows that the Commissior. 
thought it was ambiguous. 
In Orren v. Phoenix Insurance Company, rn 
N.,V.2d 166 (Minn. 1970) there was a dispute as fo 
whether a limitation in an insurance policy applied to" 
single or aggregate loss. After a dispute arose the insur. 
ance policy provisions were amended to expressly pm 
vide that an aggregate loss was meant. The insured of. 
fered evidence of the subsequent amendment, to whicl1 
the insurer objected on the grounds that it was irrelevan! 
and that it was incompetent for policy reasons. The Su· 
preme Court of Minnesota said: · 
".Moreover, in our opinion, the change in lan-
guage made in the revised policy persuasive!) 
illustrates the ambiguity. The defendant, by add-
ing the words 'in the aggregate' has precisely stal-
ed what it attempted to state in the policy issue1l 
to plaintiff's. Nor did the court err in giving evi-
dential consideration to the language of the later 
policy over defendant's objection of irrelevancy. 
Clearly, on the decisive issue of whether or not the 
language of the 1966 policy is ambiguous, the re-
vised language is relevant. Once it is establishe.c 
that the policy is in fact that of defendant, as th11 
record requires us to assume, the revised languag1 
is admissible as a written admission by defendant. 
conflictin,q with its contention at trial that the sim· 
ilar provision in its 1.9(Jf1 policy is clear and url!1m· . 
biguous. [citing cases J We also find no merit 1n 
def enclant' s argument before this court that the 
language revision should be excluded for the sa!llf 
reason that eYidence of alterations or repairs after 
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an accident is excluded in a negligence case. As 
defendant points out, the policy behind that rule 
is that the admission of such facts would discour-
age such persons from improving or repairing the 
injury-causing agent because they would fear 
evidential use of such acts to their disadvantage. 
See, \Vigmore, Evidence ( 3 Ed.) §283. That 
policy does not, however, apply to this case. Un-
like the typical situati~m in a negligence case, the 
defendants' failure to change the policy language 
works only to the detriment of the defendant and 
does not endanger the safety of the public. As has 
been noted, ambiguous language in an insurance 
policy must be construed against the insurer. 
Thus, given ambiguous language, it is to the in-
surer's benefit to change it and the failure to do so 
exposes the insurer to the risk of an interpreta-
tiou favorable to the insured." [Emphasis added} 
id. at 169. 
II 
The contractor's interpretation of the ambiguous 
contractual provision was reasonable and should have 
been adopted as against the party who wrote the provi-
swn. 
The contract before the court, including the 1968 
interim specifications, was written by the Commission. 
The ambiguous specification, therefore, must be con-
strued strictly against the Commission. See Huber ~ 
R01L'l1111d Constrnction Co. v. City of South Salt Lake, 
i lTtah 2d 273, 823 P.2d 258 (1958); Gregerson v. 
Equitable Life q; Casualty Ins. Co., 123 Utah 152, 256 
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ant's interpretations lie within the zone of reason-
ableness; neither appears to rest on an obvious 
error in drafting, a gross discrepancy, or an in-
advertent but glaring gap; the arguments, rather, 
are quite closely in balance. It is precisely to this 
type of contract that this court has applied the 
rule that if some substantive provision of a gov-
ernment-drawn agreement is fairly susceptible of 
a certain construction and the contractor actually 
and reasonably so construes it, in the course of 
bidding or performance, that is the interpretation 
which will be adopted-unless the partys' inten-
tion is otherwise affirmatively revealed. * * * 
"This rule is fair both to the drafters and those 
who are required to accept or reject the contract 
as proffered, without haggling. Although the po-
tential contractor may have some duty to inquire 
about a major patent discrepancy or obvious 
omission, or a drastic conflict in provisions * * * 
he is not normally required (absent a clear warn-
ing in the contract) to seek clarification of any 
and all ambiguities, doubts, or possible differences 
in interpretation. The government, as the author, 
has to shoulder the major task of seeing that with-
in the zone of reasonableness the words of the 
agreement communicate the proper notions-as 
well as the main risk of a failure to carry that re-
sponsibility." id. at 876-877. 
W. G. Cornell Company of Washington, D.C., Inc. 
t'. The United States, 376 F.2d 299 (Ct. Cl. 1967) in-
rolved a question of whether specifications permitted 
flexible as well as rigid types of insulation within supply 
and return ducts of an air conditioning system. The gov-
rniment relied upon a federal specification incorporated 
;n the <.'.ontract which required rigid material, while the 
21 
P.2d 566 ( 1953); 1'he Continental Bank and Tru
1
: 
Company v. Bybee et al., G Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 7i:
1 
( 1957). 
That is not to say that the company may adopt am 
interpretation of the contract it wishes. 'Ve recogniz~ 
that the interpretation claimed by the non-drafting parh 
must be a permissible one under the language of the con 
tract and the context in which it was prepared or, as som1 
courts say, the interpretation must have been "reason-
able." 
In WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. The United Statei. 
323 F.2d 87 4 (Ct. Cl. 1968) the court was called upon 
to interpret a contract prepared by the government. Tht 
dispute involved a question of whether five componentl 
of generator sets had to be manufactured by (or witn 
lhe authorization of) certain named companies, a) 
claimed by the government ,or whether plaintiff was en· 
titled under the contract to furnish identical componen!i 
made by other firms. The government relied in large par! 
upon references to specific part numbers designed b: 
particular fabricators while the contractor emphasize1l 
the lack of express mandatory language. In resolving tht 
dispute the court said: 
"The summar,\' of the opposing contentions. ii 
enough to show that no sure guide to the solution 
of the problem can be found within the four cor· 
ners of the contraclual document. As with s11 
many other agreements, there is something fur 
each party and no ready answer can be drawi: 
from the texts alone. Both plaintiff's and defeno· 
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('nntrnPt<w reli1·d 1111 rt 1111rfi,111 111' tlw lt'1·lrniPrd prnYisiiq 
:.i.u<l sµn:ificaliuu,:; µennitlcd tl1L'. use ui "utl1cr e4u:ill 
suitable material." In its decision the court quoted \\Ji 
apprornl ll ul-Gar iJianufacturiny Corp. v. Unifi 
States, HW Ct. CI. :38-1<, i351 F.:M 97i ( 1965), tot~ 
effect that an interpretatiou will he preferred which gin 
a reasonable meaning to all parts of an instrument rath1 
than an interpretation which leaves a portion of the co: 
tract useless, inexplicable, inoperative, void, insigniL 
cant, meaningless or superfluous. The court added: 
"In my opinion, the technical provisious and sper 
fications incorporated in the contract are ambigi1 
ous and this tact is il!ustrated by the conftictin; 
interpretations µlaced upon them by the partie: 
which joined in giving birth to this lawsuit. Wht 
the provisions are considered together, as the 
must be, it is apparent that more than one reasor: 
able conclusion can be reached. That is to say,, 
appears to me that the meaning of these pror1 
sions is not so explicit as to put the contractor 11 
notice that only rigid insulation would be accept 
d * * ,_,. e . 
"It is clear plaintiff did not consider that the sp1 
cif ications furnished by the government were ur1 
clear, ambiguous, or subject to a constructiondil 
ferent than the one given to them by plaintil: 
The record shows that plaintiff prepared its b11 
and planned and attempted to perform th~ co: 
tract work, in a manner consistent with its mtei 
pretation and construction of the contract sp~~if' 
cation'>. Plaintiff gave a meaning to the sped.1r.i 
tions which, in light of its knowledge of how suu 
lar contracts had been treated in the past, was !11 
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unreasonable or in any way improper under the 
circumstances. 
''I am very careful to distinguish this case from 
those decisions which impose the duty on the con-
tractor to make inquiry of the government when 
he is presented with contract specifications dis-
closing 'an obvious omission, inconsistency, or 
discrepancy of significance.' * * * It is not every 
possible ambiguity or doubt which creates such 
duty. And 'within the zone of reasonableness,' the 
risk of a difference of interpretation must be 
borne by the government." id. at 309-310. 
One of the most frequently cited government con-
Ii tract cases is Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 
JI 
n 
ii 
ti 
109 Ct. C 1. 390 ( 1947) , wherein the court said: 
"* * * 'Vhere the government draws specifica-
tions which are fairly susceptible of a certain con-
struction and the contractor actually and reason-
ably so construes them, justice and equity require 
that that construction be adopted. 'Vhere one of 
the parties to a contract draws a document and 
uses therein language which is susceptible of more 
than one meaning, and the intention of the par-
ties does not otherwise appear, that meaning will 
be given the document which is more favorable to 
the party who did not draw it. The rule is espe-
cially applicable to government contracts where 
the contractor has nothing to say as to its pro-
visions." id. at 418. 
The experience and competence of Gibbons and 
Reed Company in highway construction should be taken 
:,\ into account in arriving at a determination of whether 
11 the meaning given to the provision by the company was 
11 
a reasonable one. 
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In D ~ L Construction Co. ~ Associates v. Unite
1 
States, 402 l<'.~d 990 (Ct. Cl. l!.)()8) the court said: 
"From the record as a whole we derive a viewo 
plaintiff, not in retrospect, but within the actua 
factual environment as of the time of the prepa 
ration of its bid, as it studied the many contrac 
documents, including numerous drawings arn 
specifications with literally thousands upon thou 
sands of details involved in a sizeable construe 
tion project. * * * Plaintiff had extensive experi 
ence in constructing mass produced housing, in 
eluding several Capehart Housing projects i1 
which there had been a generaliy consistent pal 
tern, of uniform foundations, footings and sten 
walls. 'i'his experience, under somewhat simila 
contracts, may be considered in determining th 
reasonableness of plaintiff's interpretation of th 
contract documents." [Emphasis added.] id. a 
994. 
Under the rule of contra preferentum, the com 
pany's interpretation should have been adopted by th 
court. This is true whether the rule is regarded as re 
quiring a "strict construction" against the party usin1 
words, or as requiring adoption of the meaning of th 
other party "within the zone of reasonableness." A 
pointed out in the analysis under Point I of the brief, tl1 
provision relating to measurement for backfill can o 
reasonably interpreted as establishing a simple rectangi: 
lar method for computing the amount of backfill, will 
out regard to the volume of the pipe. This construction 
supported not only by the other contractual provision 
hut by the fact that the Commission, by its own admi~ 
sion, viewed the provision as being ambiguous, that ke 
24 
personnel un the staff of the resident engineer had doubt 
as to the clarity, and that at least one other resident en-
gineer of the Commission interpreted the agreement as 
the company did. It is of some significance too, that the 
use of a rectangle for computation purposes involves a 
rather simple mathematical concept, while deduction for 
the volume of the pipe involves a complicated formula, 
and that the resident engineer in charge of the project 
acknowledged that it doesn't make any difference 
whether the volume of the pipe was included or excluded 
so long as the method of measurement is known ( R. 103). 
CONCLUSION 
For the belt route project Gibbons and Reed Com-
pany had to prepare a bid under a set of specificatio~s 
which were new to it and to the Road Commission. It 
considered the "backfill" specification in light of other 
contractual provisions and its experience as a highway 
contractor for many years. It adopted an interpretation 
1rhich under the circumstances was reasonable, and inas-
much as the Road Commission prepared the contractual 
documents, that interpretation should be adopted by the 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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